Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Edward Oniskor v. Samuel W. Smith, Warden, Utah
State Prison : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce C Lubeck; Attorney for Appellant.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; Earl F Dorius; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Oniskor v. Smith, No. 14003.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/120

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

«

4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY]

STATE OF UTAH

DEC 9 1975
mmm

EDWARD ONISKOR,

YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
14003

-vsSAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, SR., JUDGE, PRESIDING.

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
BRUCE C. LUBECK
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

F
JUM6-1975

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD ONISKOR,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

:
:

SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
14003

:

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, SR., JUDGE, PRESIDING.

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
BRUCE C. LUBECK
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
• •
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1
ARGUMENT
POINT I: APPELLANT'S USE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IS INAPPROPRIATE AND
THUS THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING
THE MOTION TO DISMISS
2
POINT II: ANY POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WAS
HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND
THUS THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING
THE MOTION TO DISMISS
•
•
9
POINT III: PRIOR UTAH SUPREME COURT
HOLDINGS DO NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A POSTCONVICTION REMEDY
•
~ 11
POINT IV: THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT
IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THAT IT GOES BEYOND
THE AVAILABLE SCOPE OF APPEAL FOR THIS
CASE
•
14
CONCLUSION
—
15
CASES CITED

'

'

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968)- 8
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
9
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
5
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)
9
Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901
(1970)
12,14
Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970)
6
In re Walker, 112 Cal.Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129 (1974) 8
Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970)-- 7
People v. Jones, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705
(1973)—
. — —
8

- i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)

ScandieLl
S i n - lair
St "it f e x
Strata
SlaU
Stale

*.
\ .
\-.

oUiilVdll

' ,i ,. i , j . 0! ..I .
* , M<- * . ^
r
L I 8 0 ( >07i !
. -- .
- -.
!
!' - * -\ -if -i i / V „ .'<i I i v < ; 11 *!
'i
(
i *d . B e s s m a n
' h r L s e n , ]22 ;,r I ,Jv>
(10 12)
-- -•-r
M.iMpr.,
__ U t . n j 2 d _ , > 2 > I , 2 d ;;>' ; ( i ' ) 7 4 ) - ' ^ i < i k ' M , 2 0 VI di 2 d 3 0 f « ,
*]l' 1 , 2 d 9 2 0 (]'»7 0
. O c a n d r o t i , 2-i i i i . d . 2 d 2 0 2 , 4 0 K T \ 2 d h 3 ^
- . 'TllIiUM,
(106FO
:

Velasquez

2 2 IM , i JrJ ?<*, 4 1 d * \ . d ' ' 0 7
.-_.-.

*,

'

d 2 -: ,

] 00(0}
s

^,

M

.

- i

••)

,

^

'

,

\

1i * I .

] ' (>2 0

- '

!

, 2

:

'

' >

STATUTES C I T E D
U t a h C o d e A n n . § 7 7 - 4 2 - 1 ( i : -0 J } --•
- U t a h R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , R u l e 6. c iB(P
Utah R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , P n i - <\nD/;i

CONSTITUTIONS CITED
Article I, § 5; Utah Constitution

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

' ! ' • , '

. -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD ONISKOR,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 14003
vs,
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the appellant, Edward Oniskor,
from an order granting a motion to dismiss.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., of the Third
Judicial District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss
in response to appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

'

Respondent submits that the order of the lower court
granting the motion to dismiss should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Complaints were signed charging the appellant with
committing robbery from a person on or about the first day of
January, 19 71, and did at the same time and place commit the
crime of murder in the first degree and further, committed at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the same time and place the crime of rape.
All evidence indicated that in the early morning hours
of New Year's Day, 19 71, Mrs, Lucille R. Pierron, who lived
alone in an apartment located on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, was
assaulted, robbed, raped and murdered by the appellant.

Appel-

lant was apprehended by the Ogden City Police after he was
observed to be in the possession of a ring and certain keys
belonging to the deceased Pierron (T. 905). After questioning
he confessed to the killing and the robbery (T. 90 7).
A verdict of guilty on all three charges was returned
by the jury.
Appellant appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme
Court which affirmed in an opinion reported in State v. Oniskor,
29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973);
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S USE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS
INAPPROPRIATE AND THUS THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The appellant's use of a writ of habeas corpus to
(1) present issues that were unsuccessfully raised on appeal,
(2) challenge the sufficiency of evidence, and (3) raise
alleged error which was known at the time of a. prior appeal but
which was not then contested, is inappropriate.
(1)

Appellant raises two issues which were previously

raised and unsuccessfully appealed

in State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah

2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973), Case No. 12696.

Appellant alleges

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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no new facts and the constitutional issues—the right to
confrontation and the admissiblity of expert testimony
based on hearsay evidence—are identical.
In State v. Oniskor, supra, the petitioner alleged
that it was a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation to allow the state to read testimony given at the
preliminary hearing by two witnesses, who were outside of
the state at the time of the trial.

510 P.2d at 930.

The Court ruled on this issue by saying:
"The use of the depositions at the
trial constituted a denial of defendant's
constitutional right of confrontation.
However, the testimony of these two absent
witnesses was merely cumulative since
others also testified to essentially the
same facts. A survey of the record reveals
that the other evidence against defendant
was so overwhelming that this court is
compelled to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the denial of defendant's rights
constituted harmless error." 510 P.2d at
931.
At the time of his appeal, petitioner also contended
that the trial court erred in its ruling that an expert witness
may render an opinion based upon hearsay evidence.
at 931.

The court ruled on this issue by saying:

-3-
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510 P.2d

"The trial court erred in its
ruling that this opinion evidence,
based on hearsay, was admissible.
This error and its effect must be
evaluated in conformity with Section
77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, which requires
this court to render judgment without
regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. To interfere with a
jury verdict, the error must be such
that it was reasonably probable that
there would have been a result more
favorable to the defendant in the
absence of error. An evaluation of
this extensive record compels a
conclusion that the asserted errors
were insignificant and in no way
resulted in prejudice to defendant's
cause. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed." 510 P.2d at 932.
As to the permissiblity of using the writ of habeas
corpus for such purposes, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
a litigant cannot present the same issues in a habeas corpus
proceeding that he had heretofore unsuccessfully raised on
appeal.

Scandrett v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 371, 489 P.2d 1186

(1971); State v. Morgan,

Utah 2d

, 527 P.2d 225 (1974).

Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court in Yanich v.
Eyman, 108 Ariz. 585, 503 P.2d 807 (1972), held that a trial
court had no jurisdiction to consider a writ of habeas corpus
where an appeal from the petitioner's conviction was pending

- 4 -

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and raised the same issues as set forth in the petition.

The

court, citing State ex rel. Bessman v. Theisen, 142 S.W. 1088
(1912), stated:
"Where one court has competent
jurisdiction of the person and is
proceeding to exercise it, it would
be a great outrage upon the administration of justice if a court of equal or
inferior jurisdiction should by virtue
of the writ of habeas corpus seek to
override the jurisdiction of the former
by discharging the person and thus
annulling its writs and processes and
rendering abortive any judgment it
might lawfully render."
Appellant cites Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 9 L.Ed.2d
837, 83 S.Ct. 822 (1963), and maintains that the rationale
behind the decision should apply to state prisoners seeking
relief in state courts.

The Supreme Court in Fay indicated

that a federal district court could review a decision
previously rendered by a competent state court by means of
the writ of habeas corpus.

The reasoning given was stated:

" . . . the state adjudication
carries the weight that federal
practice gives to the conclusion of
a court . . . of another jurisdiction
on federal constitutional issues.
It is not res judicata."

- 5 -
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The Court merely reiterated its position on federal review
of state determination of federal constitutional issues.
The attempt by appellant to apply the above case to a state
prisoner's use of habeas corpus to circumvent a previously
rendered state final decision is inappropriate and there is
a vast difference between federal review of a state interpretation of federal questions and the type of intra-state
review appellant is seeking.
Appellant presents the same due process arguments
to this court in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus as was unsuccessfully presented to the Utah Supreme
Court in the appeal from conviction.

Therefore, as per the

case law cited above, the motion to dismiss should be affirmed.
(2)

Appellant contends that his conviction of

rape and murder is so devoid of evidentiary support as to
amount to a denial of due process.

It is well established

that the appellant cannot raise questions of insufficiency of
evidence to sustain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970),
the Court of Appeals stated:

- 6 -
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"The sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction
is not subject to review in our
federal habeas corpus proceedings
unless the conviction is so devoid
of evidentiary support as to have
a due process issue."
See also Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert, den. 405 U.S. 1048 (1972); Mathis v. Colorado, 425
F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970).
In addition, appellant's claim of insufficient
evidence is without merit because (1) there was a confession
which was entered into the record and was ruled voluntarily
given, wherein petitioner admitted suffocating the victim
(T.750); (2) petitioner took the stand and related the events
of the murder and admitted that he had suffocated and had
sexual intercourse with the victim (T.881,882) ; (3) petitioner
called his own psychiatrist who testified that the petitioner
had informed him he had suffocated and had intercourse with
the victim (T.811).

Furthermore, in State v. Oniskor, supra,

the court found that the evidence against appellant was
"overwhelming."
(3)

510 P.2d at 931.
Appellant did not raise the issue of insuf-

ficiency of evidence at his appeal from conviction in
State v. Oniskor, supra.

If appellant claims that there

was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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murder and rape, this certainly would have been known to him
at the time he appealed his conviction.

Plis failure to raise

the issue on appeal bars him from using the writ of habeas
corpus as a substitute appeal under current case law.
The Utah Supreme Court has held in Velasquez v. Pratt,
21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 1020 (1968):
"[H]abeas corpus is not and cannot
properly be used in the place of a
regular appellate review. As to any
claimed error or irregularity which was
known or should have been known to the
appellant at the time of judgment, there
was first an obligation to call it to the
trial court's attention and seek remedy; and
that failing, there was next a duty to seek
review and correction on appeal. If that
is not done within the time allowed by law,
the judgment becomes final and not subject
to further attack for any matters which
could have been so reviewed on regular
appeal.11
The California Supreme Court held accordingly in In re Walker,
112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129 (1974), when it stated:
"The general rule is that habeas corpus
cannot serve as a substitute for appeal, and,
in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that
remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed
errors could have been, but were not, raised
upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction. "
See also Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968);
People v. Jones, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705 (1973).
For the above reasons, respondent contends that
appellant has made inappropriate use of the writ of habeas corpus
and, therefore., the order granting the motion to dismiss should
be affirmed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
ANY POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WAS HARMLESS ERROR BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND THUS
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
It is well settled that if the errors of the lower
court, alleged on appeal, are so insignificant as to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, such errors cannot be used as a
basis for reversal.
The United States Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967),
declined to adopt the rule that all federal constitutional
errors must be per se "harmful."

The Court stated:

"We conclude that there may be
some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution,
be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of the conviction."
The Court went on to establish the standard to b6
used in determining when a particular error is "harmless,"
". . .that before a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.)
Chapman reaffirmed in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
23 L.Ed.2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Scandrett, 24
Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2.d 639 (1970), held:
11

. • . [T]here is a presumption that
such error is prejudicial, but that it
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it
had no such prejudicial effect upon the
proceedings. Correlative to this it is
also true that when the guilt is shown
by other untainted evidence so overwhelming that there is no likelihood whatsoever
of a different result in the absence of
such error or irregularity, there should
be no reversal."
Furthermore, this position has been codified in
Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953):
"After hearing an appeal the court
must give judgment without regard to
defects which do not affect the substantial right of the parties. If
error has been committed, it shall
not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has that effect before it
is warranted in reversing the judgment."
The Utah Supreme Court has already held in Statev. Oniskor, supra, that the errors asserted in this petition
—

the denial of the right to confrontation and the admissibility

of expert testimony —

were, as a matter of law, "harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt."

Referring to the errors alleged

on appeal, the Court said:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"A survey of the record reveals
that the other evidence against defendant
was so overwhelming that this court is
compelled to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the denial of defendant's
rights constituted harmless error.
"An evaluation of this extensive
record compels a conclusion that the
asserted errors were insignificant and
in no way resulted in prejudice to
defendant's cause."
The evidence against appellant, consisting of his
own confession and the direct testimony of other witnesses, ,
is so overwhelming, any possible violation of appellant's
constitutional rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and does not call for reversal.
POINT III
PRIOR UTAH SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS DO NOT PRECLUDE THE
USE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A POST-CONVICTION REMEDY.
Appellant contends that the holdings of Scandrett v.
Turner, supra, and Velasquez v. Pratt, supra, abrogate Article
I, § 5 of the Utah Constitution in that they preclude the
use of the writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy.
Such assertion is without merit.
First, Article I, § 5, which states that the writ of
habeas corpus will not be suspended unless required by rebellion,

- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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invasion, or public safety, pertains to the traditional
type of habeas corpus as outlined in Rule 65B(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure—not the post-conviction type of
Rule 65B(i) sought by appellant in this case.
Second, the cases cited only limit the availability
of the writ, of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy—
they do not preclude it.

The Utah Supreme Court in Scandrett

v. Turner, supra, and Velasquez v. Pratt, supra, has indicated
the need to limit the use of habeas corpus as a post-conviction
remedy based mainly on the public policy as expressed in
Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970) :
"The efficient and orderly
administration of justice and respect
for the finality of judgments
regularly arrived at demand that
the merry-go-round of litigation
stop somewhere."
However, the Court has not precluded the use of habeas corpus
altogether as a post-conviction remedy.

The Court in Johnson

v. Turner, supra, went on to say:
" . . . where it appears that
there has been a miscarriage of justice
that it would be unconscionable not to
re-examine a conviction, . . . we do not
regard the rules of procedure as being
so absolute as to prevent us from

- 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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correcting any such obvious
injustice."
The above indicates when such use of habeas corpus would be
appropriate.
In Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d
907 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the use
of the writ of habeas corpus as a collateral attack to an
appeal is appropriate only:
" . . . when the interests of
justice so demand because of some
extraordinary circumstances or
exigency; e.g.,
(1) lack of jurisdiction,
(2) mistaken identity,
(3) where the requirements of
law have been so ignored or distorted
that the accused has been deprived of
due process of law, or
(4) there is shown to exist some
other such circumstance that it would
be unconscionable not to review the
conviction."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, while the Utah Supreme Court has specified
under what circumstances the writ of habeas corpus can be
used as a collateral attack to an appeal, those available
situations are limited and carefully scrutinized.
In the instant case, appellant has failed to show
such "extraordinary" or "exigent" circumstances.

- 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant

was represented by competent counsel during his original
appeal in State v. Oniskor, supra, and the Court found
that the evidence against him was so overwhelming that any
possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, appellant's use of the writ of habeas corpus fails
to satisfy the requirements of Sullivan v. Turner, supra, or
Johnson v. Turner, supra, and thus should be dismissed.
POINT IV
. THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT IS INAPPROPRIATE
IN THAT IT GOES BEYOND THE AVAILABLE SCOPE OF APPEAL FOR
THIS CASE.
Appellant seeks as relief on appeal "the reversal
of the order of the lower court and the granting of his
petition."

Such relief is inappropriate since the only

issue on appeal is the validity of the order granting the
motion to dismiss.

Thus, the only issues to be appealed are

those presented in the motion to dismiss; namely, the use
of the writ of habeas corpus as a substitute for appellate
review, as a second appeal, or to challenge the sufficiency
of evidence; and the extent of harmless error.

Requesting

this Court to grant appellant's petition is improper since

- 14 -
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this would deny respondent the opportunity of presenting
supporting evidence in an appropriate hearing.

The only

relief that may be requested by appellant is a remand for
hearing—not a granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's inappropriate use of the writ of
habeas corpus and the "harmless" and non-prejudicial nature
of the alleged errors warrants an affirmation by this
Court of the order granting the motion to dismiss.

Further-

more, as a policy matter, appellant should be precluded from
using the writ of habeas corpus to relitigate issues that
have previously been adjudicated and finally determined on
appeal.
process.

There must be at some point an end to the judicial
The writ of habeas corpus was never intended to

be a tool to needlessly extend the resolution of previously
adjudicated issues.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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